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Abstract
The principle of Photo Response Non-Uniformity
(PRNU) is used to link an image with its source, i.e., the
sensor that produced it. In this work, we investigate if it
is possible to modify an iris image acquired using one sen-
sor in order to spoof the PRNU noise pattern of a different
sensor. In this regard, we develop an image perturbation
routine that iteratively modifies blocks of pixels in the orig-
inal iris image such that its PRNU pattern approaches that
of a target sensor. Experiments indicate the efficacy of the
proposed perturbation method in spoofing PRNU patterns
present in an iris image whilst still retaining its biometric
content.
1. Introduction
The process of automatically determining the sensor that
produced a given image is referred to as sensor identifica-
tion. While a number of sensor identification methods have
been discussed in the literature [41, 23, 12], the ones based
on Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU) [35, 14, 21]
have gained prominence in the recent literature. PRNU
refers to the non-uniform response of individual pixels
across the sensor array to the same illumination as a conse-
quence of manufacturing defects introduced during sensor
production. PRNU manifests itself as a noise pattern in the
images generated by a sensor. This noise pattern is believed
to be unique to every sensor [20]. A number of schemes
have been designed to compute the PRNU noise of a sensor
based on the images generated by it [9].
More recently, the principle of PRNU has been used to
perform sensor identification in the context of iris biomet-
rics by processing the near-infrared (NIR) ocular images ac-
quired by typical iris sensors [43, 27, 17, 15, 16, 10, 11, 36,
8]. In this case, sensor identification (or device identifica-
tion) can be used in conjunction with biometric recognition
to authenticate both the identity of a device (e.g., a smart-
phone) as well as the individual using the device [22].
Given the forensic value of PRNU in determining the
origin of an image (i.e., the sensor or device that produced
Figure 1: The objective of this work is to perturb an ocu-
lar (iris) image such that its PRNU pattern is modified to
spoof that of another sensor, while not adversely impacting
its biometric utility.
it), we explore if it is possible to alter an image such that
its source, as assessed by a PRNU estimation scheme, is
confounded. We impose two constraints:
1. The modified image must spoof the PRNU pattern of a
pre-specified target sensor.
2. The biometric utility of the modified image must be
retained, viz., the modified ocular image must match
successfully with the original image.
This kind of attack can be considered as a ‘targeted
attack’, since the sensor whose PRNU pattern has to be
spoofed is pre-specified. In the literature, it is also referred
to as fingerprint-copy attack [26, 43], because the objective
is to copy the sensor pattern or ‘fingerprint’ corresponding
to the target sensor to an image acquired using a different
source sensor. The proposed work has two distinct benefits.
Firstly, it allows us to assess the feasibility of PRNU spoof-
ing from a counter-forensic perspective. The widespread
use of forensic techniques for examining the validity and
origin of digital media [24, 30] necessitates the study of
attacks that can potentially undermine the performance of
such forensic methods. For example, an adversary may ma-
liciously attempt to link an image to a different camera in an
effort to mislead law enforcement investigators [26]. Sec-
ondly, establishing the viability of such spoof attacks would
promote the development of more robust PRNU estimation
schemes [36]. In addition, effective methods to detect such
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Figure 2: The proposed algorithm for deriving perturbations for the input image using the candidate image. (a) Steps involved
in modifying the original image from the source sensor using a candidate image from the target sensor (see Algorithm 1),
and (b) role of the candidate image in the perturbation engine (see Algorithm 2).
attacks can be developed if the process of spoofing is better
understood. Figure 1 summarizes the objective of this work.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 briefly reviews the PRNU based sensor identifica-
tion scheme used in this work. Section 3 presents meth-
ods that have been described in the literature for sensor
anonymization and spoofing. Section 4 describes the pro-
posed method for spoofing PRNU patterns. Section 5 pro-
vides details about the datasets used, the experimental pro-
tocols employed, and reports the results obtained using the
proposed method. Section 6 summarizes the paper and in-
dicates future work.
2. Photo Response Non-Uniformity (PRNU)
PRNU estimation entails computing the reference pat-
tern of a sensor based on a set of training images acquired
using the sensor. This reference pattern is then used by
a sensor classifier to identify the sensor that was used to
acquire a given test image. This is accomplished by cor-
relating the reference pattern of the sensor with the noise
residual of the test image to compute a correlation score.
The image is assigned to the sensor whose reference pattern
yields the highest correlation value. Here, we used Nor-
malized Cross-Correlation (NCC) for computing the corre-
lation score [15, 10]. PRNU estimation can be done using
numerous approaches [35, 31, 28, 34, 33, 9]. In this work,
we used the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) based
PRNU estimation scheme [14], which has been demon-
strated to suppress image artifacts not associated with the
sensor-specific pattern and has resulted in very good perfor-
mance [17, 15].
MLE based PRNU estimation uses a weighted averaging
of the noise residuals extracted from a set of training images
pertaining to the sensor; each noise residual is weighted by
its corresponding training image, to derive the maximum-
likelihood estimate of the reference pattern. Wiener filtering
and zero-mean operations are applied to the noise residuals
to address interpolation artifacts arising due to the Bayer
pattern. In our experiments, L2−normalization of the test
noise residual is performed to account for the variations in
the PRNU strength of different sensors [29]. The MLE
of the reference pattern corresponding to a sensor is com-
puted as, Kˆ =
∑N
i=1wiIi∑N
i=1 I
2
i
. Here, wi is the noise residual
obtained using a wavelet-based denoising filter applied to
training image Ii and wi = Ii − F (Ii), where, F denotes
the Daubechies Quadrature Mirror Filter [35].
3. Perturbing the PRNU Pattern
The counter-forensics literature describes techniques
that can be used to suppress or perturb the PRNU pattern
embedded in an image. This is often referred to as source
anonymization [19], i.e., obscuring the ‘fingerprint’ of the
source sensor in an image so as to anonymize the origin
of the image. Source anonymization can be used as a pri-
vacy preservation scheme, particularly relevant when the
sensor-specific details can be used to associate a sensor with
its owner. Assuming that each device is typically associ-
ated with a single user, device identification can be indi-
rectly used to reveal the identity of the person possessing
that specific device [40]. There have been primarily two
approaches to perturb the PRNU pattern for this purpose,
namely, (i) compression and filtering based schemes, which
typically use strong filtering schemes such as, flat-field sub-
traction [44] or Wiener filtering [13] that can degrade the
PRNU pattern leading to incorrect source attribution; and
(ii) geometric perturbation based schemes such as ‘seam
carving’ [18, 13] that distorts the alignment between the
sensor reference pattern and the test noise residual, thereby
impeding the process of correlating the reference pattern
with the test noise residual.
In contrast to source anonymization, PRNU spoofing not
only suppresses the fingerprint of the source sensor, but it
also inserts the fingerprint of the target sensor. An adver-
sary may tamper with the digital evidence to maliciously
exculpate a guilty person or worse, incriminate an inno-
cent person. In recent literature, PRNU spoofing has been
performed by two methods, namely, (i) PRNU injection
and (ii) PRNU substitution. The first method adds the
weighted reference pattern of a pre-selected target sensor
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to the input image, I [26]. The modified image becomes
I′ = [I + I × γKˆT]. Here, KˆT is the reference pattern
of the target sensor T and γ is a scalar parameter. The
second method subtracts the PRNU pattern of the source
sensor in an image and then adds the PRNU pattern of a
target sensor [32]. The modified image is represented as
I′ = I − γKˆS + βKˆT. I belongs to the source sensor S,
whose reference pattern is KˆS. γ and β are scalar terms.
We will use the two methods described above, i.e., PRNU
injection and PRNU substitution, as baseline algorithms for
comparative evaluation. The first method will be referred to
as Baseline 1 and the second method will be referred to as
Baseline 2. Both baseline algorithms have been shown to
be successful on images acquired using commercial cam-
eras that employ RGB sensors.
In [43], the authors examine the viability of PRNU
spoofing via injection in the context of iris sensors operat-
ing in the NIR spectrum [25]. In their work, they computed
the forged image as I′ = [F(I) + γKˆT]. Here, F (·) is the
wavelet based denoising filter discussed in Section 2, and
γ is a scalar parameter. The authors further performed the
triangle test to detect the spoof attack, but did not analyze
the impact of the PRNU spoofing on iris recognition perfor-
mance.
In this paper, our objective is to perform PRNU spoofing
in a principled manner, that works for any arbitrary pair of
source and target iris sensors. In addition, we wish to retain
the biometric utility of the PRNU-spoofed image. The task
of spoofing can be potentially accomplished through differ-
ent techniques, an example will be the use of adversarial
networks that have been successfully utilized for perturb-
ing images in the current literature [38, 37]. However, a
significant bottleneck of deep-learning based techniques is
the need for large amount of training data for driving the
perturbation process. We will demonstrate the success of
the proposed PRNU spoofing scheme using small number
of images (<1000).
4. Proposed method
In this section, we formally describe the objective and
the method used to address this objective.
4.1. Problem formulation
Let X denote an NIR iris image of width w and height
h, and S = {S1, S2, .., Sn}, denote a set of n sensors.
Let φ(X,Si) be the function that computes the normalized
cross-correlation (NCC) between the noise residual of X
and the PRNU reference pattern of sensor Si. Then, the sen-
sor label for the input iris image X can be determined us-
ing arg max
i
{φ(X,Si)}. Furthermore, letM be a biometric
matcher where M(X1, X2) determines the match score be-
tween two iris samples X1 and X2. Given an input iris im-
ageX acquired using sensor So, a candidate imageXc from
the target sensor St, and an iris matcherM our goal is to de-
vise a perturbation engine Ψ that can modify the input im-
age as Y = Ψ(X,Xc) such that φ(Y, So) < φ(Y, St), and
thereby predict St as the sensor label of the perturbed im-
age Y, while the iris matcher, M, will successfully match Y
with X . As a result, the target sensor will be spoofed, while
the biometric utility of the image will be retained. This im-
plies that the match score between a pair of perturbed im-
ages [M(Y1, Y2)] as well as that of a perturbed sample with
an original sample, [M(X1, Y2)] and [M(Y1, X2)], are ex-
pected to be similar to the match scores between the original
samples [M(X1, X2)]. The steps used to achieve this task
are described next.
Algorithm 1: Selection of the candidate image.
Input: An image X from sensor So, a gallery of images
G = {X1, ..., XL} from the target sensor St
Output: A candidate image, Xc, selected from the gallery.
1 Set static parameters K = 10 (number of random patches)
and wp = 10, hp = 10, (patch width and height).
2 Generate a set of K random patch locations
P = {p1, · · · , pK}, where each patch size is hp × wp.
3 Compute the average pixel intensity in each patch pk ∈ P of
the input image X to obtain a vector vX (of size K).
4 Repeat step 3 for each of the gallery images to obtain a set of
vectors vGi , where, i = 1, · · · , L. The value of L (the
target gallery size) depends on the number of test images
indicated in the fourth column in Table 1.
5 Compute the correlation between vX and vGi
corresponding to each gallery image to obtain a set of L
correlation scores.
6 Return candidate image Xc ∈ G that has the highest
correlation, i.e. Xc = Xf where
f = argmax
i∈[1,··· ,L]
{Corr(vX ,vGi)}.
4.2. Deriving perturbations and PRNU Spoofing
Given a single image X from the source sensor So,
a gallery of images G = {X1, ..., XL} from the target
sensor St, and a set of K random patch locations P =
{p1, ..., pK}, we first select a candidate image, Xc, c ∈
[1, · · · , L], from the gallery to perturb the input image. The
candidate image is selected from the gallery such that it is
maximally correlated with the input image X . To accom-
plish this goal, we select 10 patches in the input image, each
of size 10 × 10 (i.e., K = 10, hp = 10, wp = 10 in Al-
gorithm 1). Now, we compute the average pixel intensity
in each of these patches and create a K-dimensional vec-
tor vX . Next, for each of the L gallery images, we cre-
ate vGi where i = [1, · · · , L], by computing the average
pixel intensity in the 10 patches selected previously in the
input image. Finally, we compute the correlation between
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Table 1: Specifications of the datasets used in this work.
Dataset Sensor Name (Abbreviation) Image Size Number of Images Used(Training set+Testing set) Number of Subjects
BioCOP 2009 Set I Aoptix Insight (Aop) 640×480 995 (55+940) 100
IITD [4] Jiristech JPC 1000 (JPC) 320×240 995 (55+940) 100
CASIAv2 Device2 [1] CASIA-IrisCamV2 (IC) 640×480 995 (55+940) 50
IIITD Multi-spectral Periocular (NIR subset) [3] Cogent (Cog) 640×480 588 (55+533) 62
ND CrossSensor Iris 2013 Set II [6] LG 4000 (LG40) 640×480 615 (55+560) 99
MMU2 [5] Panasonic BM-ET 100US Authenticam (Pan) 320×238 55 (55+0) 6
ND Cosmetic Contact Lens 2013 [6] IrisGuard IG AD100 (AD) 640×480 55 (55+0) 4
WVU Off-Axis EverFocus Monochrome CCD (Ever) [42] 640×480 55 (55+0) 7
CASIAv2 Device 1 [1] OKI IrisPass-h (OKI) 640×480 55 (55+0) 3
CASIAv4-Iris Thousand subset [2] IrisKing IKEMB100 (IK) 640×480 55 (55+0) 3
ND CrossSensor Iris 2013 Set I [6] LG 2200 (LG22) 640×480 55 (55+0) 5
the vectors vX and vGi , and select the candidate image with
the maximum correlation value. The steps for selecting the
candidate image are described in Algorithm 1.
After obtaining the candidate image Xc from the gallery
of the target sensor St, the perturbations for image X are
then derived with the help of Xc as described in Algo-
rithm 2. The perturbation routine employs the following
parameters: (i) α (the learning rate), (ii) η (the termination
criterion), and (iii) m (the maximum number of iterations).
Initially, the output perturbed image Y (0) is identical to the
input image X . Next, we select a random patch location
from Y (0), and create a mask matrix, Mask , of the same
size as Y (0), such that the elements in Mask are set to 1
for the row and column indices corresponding to the se-
lected patch location. Then, the image Y (0) is perturbed
iteratively using pixels from the same patch location in Xc.
In each iteration, the pixels inside the selected patch are up-
dated along two directions. The candidate image guides the
direction of perturbation [39]. In the first case the perturba-
tion is along a positive direction (implemented using line 9
in Algorithm 2), which generates Y u. The other direction
corresponds to a negative perturbation (see line 11 in Algo-
rithm 2), which produces Y v . Figure 2(b) illustrates the role
of the candidate image in the perturbation routine. Next, the
noise residuals extracted from (Y u, Y v) are correlated with
the reference pattern of the target sensor. The perturbed im-
age yielding the maximum correlation value is then selected
as the seed image for the next iteration, iter. This process is
repeated until the relative difference between the NCC val-
ues of perturbed image Y iter with respect to target sensor
St and the original sensor So exceeds 10%, i.e., η = 0.1,
or the maximum number of iterations is reached. The pa-
rameters employed in the perturbation routine are selected
intuitively; for example, the learning rate is set to a small
value α = 0.01 because our objective is to perturb the im-
age while preserving its biometric utility.
At the end of the routine, the perturbed image will have
to be incorrectly attributed to St by the sensor classifier.
The steps of the PRNU spoofing algorithm are illustrated in
Figure 2(a). The sequence of modified images undergoing
the perturbation routine is illustrated for two example iris
Algorithm 2: Spoofing PRNU pattern.
Input: An image Xh×w from sensor So, a candidate image
Xc from sensor St, a function φ(X,Si) that returns
the NCC value when image X is correlated with the
PRNU pattern of sensor Si (i ∈ {o, t}).
Output: perturbed image Y .
1 Set static parameters α = 0.01 (learning rate), η = 0.1
(threshold), m = 3000 (maximum number of iterations)
and hp = 10, wp = 10 (patch size).
2 Initialize iter = 0 and Y (0) = X .
3 repeat
5 – Choose a random patch location (px, py) from [0, hhp ]
and [0, w
wp
] such that 0 ≤ px < hhp , 0 ≤ py < wwp .
7 – Construct the mask matrix Mask such that
Mask [i, j] = 1 if
(
b i
hp
c, b j
wp
c
)
= (px, py), and
Mask [i, j] = 0 elsewhere.
9 – Create a perturbed image in the positive direction
Y u = Y (iter) + αMask 
(
Xc − Y (iter)
)
.
11 – Create a perturbed image in the negative direction
Y v = Y (iter) − αMask 
(
Xc − Y (iter)
)
.
13 – Compute the NCC values of Y u and Y v for the target
sensor St, φ(Y u, St) and φ(Y v, St), respectively.
15 – Set Y (iter+1) = Y u if φ(Y u, St) > φ(Y v, St),
otherwise set Y (iter+1) = Y v ,
17 – iter ++,
19 – If iter > m break the loop.
20 until φ(Y
(iter), St)− φ(Y (iter), So)
φ(X,So)
> η;
21 Return the final perturbed image, Y (iter).
images in Figure 3.
5. Experiments and Results
In this section, we describe the datasets and sensors em-
ployed in this work, followed by the experiments conducted
on the datasets. Results are reported and analyzed in the
context of PRNU spoofing and iris recognition.
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Figure 3: Illustration of PRNU spoofing using images belonging to the source sensor JPC and the candidate images belonging
to the target sensor Aoptix.
5.1. Datasets
Experiments are conducted using 11 different sensors
from 11 iris datasets. The PRNU spoofing process typically
involves a single source sensor and a single target sensor
from the set of 11 sensors. The sensor details and image
specifications of the 11 sensors are described in Table 1.
Thus, there can be a total of P11 2 = 110 combinations for
PRNU spoofing. However, for the sake of brevity, we per-
formed 20 different PRNU spoofing experiments involving
5 sensors: {Aop, JPC, IC,Cog, LG40}. From the set of 5
sensors listed above, each sensor serves as the source sen-
sor while the remaining 4 sensors serve as target sensors
one at a time, thus resulting in 20 different PRNU spoofing
experiments.
5.2. Sensor identification before PRNU spoofing
Due to variations in image size of the source and target
sensors, all images were resized to a fixed spatial resolu-
tion of 160 × 120 to facilitate PRNU spoofing. We then
evaluated the sensor identification accuracy based on these
resized images prior to PRNU spoofing. This is to deter-
mine if resizing impacts sensor identification accuracy. The
sensor identification involves deriving sensor reference pat-
terns using 55 training images, as used in [10] from each of
the 11 sensors, followed by extraction of test noise residuals
from images belonging to the 5 sensors, and finally corre-
lating them. The subjects in the training set and the test set
are disjoint. The sensor identification accuracy and the cor-
responding confusion matrix is presented in Table 2. The
results indicate a very high sensor identification accuracy
using the MLE PRNU scheme on the resized images. So
we use the resized images in the experiments below.
5.3. Sensor identification after PRNU spoofing
The PRNU spoofing process involves perturbing the
original image from a source sensor using a candidate im-
age belonging to the target sensor, whose PRNU needs to
be spoofed. The impact of the perturbations on spoofing the
PRNU pattern has been reported in terms of Spoof Success
Rate (SSR), which computes the proportion of test images
from the source sensor classified as belonging to the target
sensor after perturbing using Algorithm 2. The results of
spoofing are presented in Table 3.
We implemented Baseline 1 and Baseline 2 algorithm
described in Section 3. Baseline 2 is implemented follow-
ing normalization of the source and target reference patterns
with respect to the maximum intensity of the PRNU present
in the two reference patterns. The normalization is required
to account for the variation in the PRNU strength associated
with different sensors. Ideally, the scalar terms γ and β,
which serve as parameters in the baseline algorithm, need
to be optimized through grid-search for a specific pair of
source (So) and target (St) sensors. However, we set the
scalars to a static value of 1 for two reasons: (i) for ease
of computation and (ii) to provide fair comparison with the
proposed algorithm which also uses fixed values of param-
eters for all pairs of sensors. The baseline algorithms are
state-of-the art to the best of our knowledge and are, there-
fore, used for comparative evaluation. Examples of per-
turbed outputs of images spoofed using Baseline 1, Baseline
2, and the proposed algorithm are presented in Figure 4.
Results in Table 3 indicate that 15 out of 20 times
the proposed algorithm outperforms Baseline 1 tech-
nique, and performs considerably better than Baseline 2
method 16 out of 20 times. The average SSR of the pro-
posed algorithm outperforms the baseline algorithms by
a significant margin. We believe that the parameters γ and
β need to be tuned accurately for each pair of source and tar-
get sensors to ensure the success of the baseline algorithms.
On the other hand, the proposed algorithm is successful for
static parameter values: the size of patches (hp × wp), the
threshold η, the learning rate α, and the number of patches
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Table 2: Confusion matrix for sensor identification involving unperturbed but resized images. The test noise residuals of im-
ages from 5 sensors are compared against reference patterns from 11 sensors. The last column indicates sensor identification
accuracy.
Actual
Predicted
Aop JPC IC Cog LG 40 Pan AD Ever OKI IK LG 22
Accuracy
(%)
Aop 900 1 2 1 9 4 3 3 9 7 1 95.74
JPC 2 919 4 2 5 0 0 4 1 2 1 97.77
IC 0 0 940 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
Cog 2 1 2 546 2 0 2 0 0 5 0 97.51
LG40 0 0 0 0 529 0 0 3 1 0 0 99.25
Table 3: Results of PRNU spoofing where the target sensors (along the second column) are spoofed by perturbing the images
from 5 source sensors, namely, Aop, JPC, IC, Cog and LG40 (along the first column). The test noise residual after the
perturbation process is compared against the reference patterns of 11 sensors (see Table 1). The last 3 columns indicate
the proportion of the perturbed images successfully classified as belonging to the target sensor and is denoted as the Spoof
Success Rate (SSR). The highest values of the SSR are bolded.
Original
Sensor
Target
Sensor Sensor classes compared against perturbed PRNU
SSR (%) for
proposed method
SSR (%) for
Baseline 1
SSR (%) for
Baseline 2
Aop
Aop JPC IC Cog LG40 Pan AD Ever OKI IK LG22
JPC 4 894 3 3 8 2 2 2 9 12 1 95.11 92.55 67.98
IC 21 0 891 0 6 2 1 5 6 5 3 94.79 92.77 13.51
Cog 7 2 3 890 7 5 2 2 13 5 4 94.68 79.89 0.21
LG40 66 4 4 4 836 3 0 4 7 8 4 88.94 79.15 10.00
JPC
Aop 905 18 3 3 4 0 0 2 2 2 1 96.28 49.15 1.91
IC 2 209 712 2 4 2 1 3 2 2 1 75.74 99.79 100
Cog 3 94 4 817 5 5 0 5 2 1 4 86.91 35.53 0.21
LG40 1 61 3 1 861 5 0 3 1 2 2 91.60 8.09 9.26
IC
Aop 910 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 96.81 48.72 0
JPC 0 797 143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 84.79 100 53.09
Cog 0 0 243 697 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 74.15 46.70 0
LG40 0 0 46 0 894 0 0 0 0 0 0 95.11 1.91 0.11
Cog
Aop 552 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 0 4 0 98.57 100 38.57
JPC 1 546 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 8 0 97.50 100 100
IC 2 0 545 2 2 0 2 0 1 5 1 97.32 100 100
LG40 1 0 0 0 550 0 2 1 0 6 0 98.21 82.32 35.00
LG40
Aop 330 0 3 0 198 0 0 0 1 1 0 61.91 9.94 1.31
JPC 0 491 0 0 38 0 0 2 1 1 0 92.12 9.38 24.20
IC 0 0 393 0 136 0 0 3 1 0 0 73.73 11.44 99.44
Cog 0 0 0 479 50 0 0 2 1 1 0 89.87 4.69 0.19
Average SSR (%) 89.21 57.60 32.75
(K) (see Section 4.2). The PRNU is successfully spoofed
by the proposed method in most of the cases barring the
case where the target sensor is Aoptix and the source sen-
sor is LG 4000 (≈62% SSR). Inspection of the images ac-
quired using LG 4000 sensor reveals the presence of image
padding, which may negatively impact the PRNU spoofing
process.
Figure 5 shows an input image undergoing iterative per-
turbations. The original (unperturbed) image belongs to
the Aoptix sensor and is perturbed using a candidate im-
age from the target sensor, Cogent. The subsequent shift of
the NCC values from being the highest for the source sensor
(Aoptix) to being the highest for the target sensor (Cogent),
indicates the success of the proposed method.
The average number of iterations required for success-
ful PRNU spoofing varied between 200 to 2200. Another
experiment is conducted to study the impact of increasing
Figure 4: Example of PRNU spoofed images originating
from the JPC 1000 sensor (first column) is illustrated for
Baseline 1 (second column), Baseline 2 (third column) and
the proposed method (last column). Here, the target sensor
is Aoptix.
the number of iterations on the proposed PRNU spoofing
process. This experiment is conducted for the specific case
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where the source sensor is LG 4000 and the target to be
spoofed is the Aoptix sensor. The reason for selecting this
pair is due to the poor SSR reported for this specific set
of sensors (see the fifth block in Table 3). We speculate
that with an increase in the number of iterations, the PRNU
spoofing process will succeed and improve the SSR as a re-
sult. In this regard, in the new experimental set-up, the max-
imum number of iterations was set to 6000 (twice the earlier
terminating criterion). As a result, the SSR increased con-
siderably from 61.91% to 79.73%, i.e., a ≈ 18% increase
was observed. 425 out of 533 test images belonging to the
LG 4000 sensor were successfully classified as originating
from the Aoptix sensor when the number of iterations was
increased.
Figure 5: Intermediate images generated when an image
from the Aoptix (So) sensor is perturbed using a candidate
image from Cogent (St). For the sake of brevity, NCC val-
ues corresponding to the reference patterns of the first 5 sen-
sors in Table 1 are mentioned in the figure. The arrows in-
dicate the increase in the NCC values corresponding to the
target sensor.
5.4. Retaining biometric matching utility
The impact of the perturbations on iris recognition
performance is evaluated next using the VeriEye iris
matcher [7]. We designed three experiments for analyzing
biometric matching performance. First, the match scores
between all pairs of iris samples before perturbation were
computed. In the second experiment, we computed the
match scores between all pairs of perturbed samples. In
the third experiment, we computed match scores between
all iris samples before perturbation and all samples after
perturbation. This is referred to as the cross-matching sce-
nario. In the third set of experiments, the genuine scores are
computed by employing 2 sample images (from the same
subject): one sample belonging to the set of unperturbed
images and the other sample from the set of perturbed im-
ages. The impostor scores are generated by pairing samples
belonging to different subjects: one image is taken from the
set of unperturbed images, while the other is taken from the
set of perturbed images.
Figure 6 shows the ROC curves obtained from these
three experiments. The ROC curves confirm that the per-
turbed images do not negatively impact the matching util-
ity. In the case of all the sensors, the ROC curves of the
perturbed images are within a 1% deviation from the ROC
curve of the original samples before perturbation, except for
the IrisCam (IC) sensor. Further, we note that the match-
ing performance of original samples from the Cogent (Cog)
sensor is degraded to begin with. We believe the reason
for this degraded performance is due to the low quality of
the original images. Yet, perturbations have not further de-
teriorated the matching performance, as evidenced by the
before- and after-perturbation ROC curves that are very
similar to each other.
In addition, the iris recognition performance after PRNU
spoofing using the baseline algorithms is analyzed. The re-
sults indicate that the proposed method is comparable to
the baseline algorithms in terms of iris recognition perfor-
mance. Furthermore, we conducted a fourth experiment,
where we analyzed the matching performance of those
LG4000 iris images that were perturbed to spoof the Aoptix
sensor after increasing the number of iterations. The result
confirms that increasing the number of iterations to improve
the SSR does not degrade matching performance, as is evi-
dent in Figure 7.
In summary, the following salient observations in the
context of both PRNU spoofing and iris recognition
preservation can be made.
• The PRNU pattern of a sensor can be successfully
spoofed by directly modifying an input image, without
invoking the sensor reference pattern of the target sen-
sor. Experiments are conducted using 11 iris sensors,
and the PRNU spoofing process is demonstrated using
5 sensors and compared with existing approaches. Re-
sults show that the proposed spoofing method outper-
forms Baseline 1 by 31.6% and Baseline 2 by 56.4%
in terms of average spoof success rate.
• The proposed spoofing algorithm uses identical param-
eters, such as the size of patches and learning rate for
all pairs of source and target sensors. This obviates
the need to fine tune the method for different pairs of
sensors.
• The iris recognition performance of the images per-
turbed using the proposed algorithm is retained within
1% of the original. This suggests the success of the
proposed spoofing method in retaining the biometric
utility of the modified images.
6. Summary and Future Work
In this work, we design a method for PRNU spoofing that
preserves biometric recognition in the context of NIR iris
images. In the proposed strategy, a test image belonging to a
particular sensor is modified iteratively using patches from a
7
Figure 6: ROC curves of matching performance obtained using the VeriEye iris matcher software. The terms ‘Original’,
‘Perturbed’ and ‘Original vs. Perturbed’ indicate the three different matching scenarios (see Section 5.4). ‘Original’ indicates
matching only unperturbed images; ‘Perturbed’ indicates matching only perturbed images; ‘Original vs. Perturbed’ indicates
the cross-matching case where unperturbed images are matched against perturbed images. Note that the curves obtained from
perturbed images match very closely with the curves corresponding to the unperturbed images illustrating preservation of iris
recognition for each sensor depicted in each column. The results are compared with Baseline 1 and 2 algorithms discussed
in Section 5.3.
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Figure 7: Impact of increase in the number of iterations
on iris recognition performance for the pair of LG 4000
(source) and Aoptix (target) sensors.
candidate image belonging to a target sensor, whose PRNU
is to be spoofed. We examine the impact of these pertur-
bations on PRNU spoofing as well as iris recognition per-
formance. Experiments are conducted in this regard using
11 sensors and compared with two existing PRNU spoofing
algorithms. Results show that the proposed method can suc-
cessfully spoof the PRNU pattern of a target sensor and does
not significantly impact the iris recognition performance in
a majority of the cases.
Future work will involve testing the proposed PRNU
spoofing process on a larger set of sensors and analyzing
the impact of the number of candidate images on the spoof
success rate. The iterative spoofing routine can be expe-
dited by perturbing multiple image patches simultaneously
(instead of one patch at a a time). Finally, we will look
into developing new sensor identification schemes that are
resilient to spoof attacks as well as methods to detect such
attacks.
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